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Abstract
This paper proposes a fair electronic gambling scheme
for the Internet. The proposed scheme provides a unique
link between payment and gambling outcome so that the
winner can be ensured to get the payment. Since an op-
timal fair exchange method is used in gambling message
exchange, the proposed system guarantees that no one can
successfully cheat during a gambling process. Our system
requires an off-line Trusted Third Party (TTP). If a cheat-
ing occurs, the TTP can resolve the problem and make the
gambling process fair.
1. Introduction
With the growth of popularity of the Internet, the Internet
has become an important marketplace for on-line gambling.
There are numerous on-line gambling and casino web sites
on the Internet. For on-line gambling to be “successful”
several issues of security need to be properly addressed.
These include fairness of gaming transactions, security of
payment and other details, privacy of players, trustworthi-
ness of the playing authorities and the ability to resolve dis-
putes. Many of existing on-line casino games provide some
level of security and privacy. However, fairness is entirely
based on the trust of the casino/dealer.
We are interested in the situations where the on-line
casino is not necessarily trusted. That is, we have “un-
trusted” gaming sites. This is particularly important in prac-
tice as in many countries on-line gambling is not regulated
by government authorities. In such cases, for instance, there
may not be any guarantee that the casino authorities are not
having an unfair advantage over the players. In such cir-
cumstances, at least as far as the playing of the game is
concerned, it is necessary to have fair exchange schemes.
A fair exchange scheme [1, 2, 3, 4] requires a trusted third
party (TTP) who helps to resolve disputes amongst the play-
ing entities. In general, the TTP can be on-line or off-line.
For efficiency reasons, it is preferable that TTP is off-line.
In this case, the TTP only comes into play when a problem
occurs in the gambling system; otherwise, TTP is not con-
tacted. In this paper, we consider a gambling scheme where
there are players and a dealer. Normally in gambling sys-
tems, a player has to bet or pay money in advance before he
or she can play the game. We will assume this in our games.
The fair exchange scheme we propose resolves the follow-
ing disputes: (1) the dealer refuses to make a payment to
the player who has won, (2) the dealer denies a payment
that was made by a player in advance, and (3) the player,
who payed to the dealer in advance, refuses to accept the
gambling outcome after he or she has lost.
An on-line gambling scheme must be associated with an
on-line payment scheme. Credit-based payment methods
[5] have been popular in on-line gambling casinos. The
payment scheme used in our system is based on a secure
electronic credit system that is similar to 3KP [6] or SET
[7].
Our contributions in this paper are twofold. First in-
volves the proposal of a fair exchange scheme for on-line
gambling transactions. Second a secure linking of the on-
line gambling with payment. Hence the overall scheme we
propose provides a unique link between a gambling pro-
cess and its associated payment and which makes the whole
transaction process fair.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section
2, we review the methods of equality proof of knowledge
([8], [9]) and proof of equivalence of discrete logarithm to
discrete log-logarithm [10]. These methods will be used in
the rest of the paper for our fair and secure on-line gambling
scheme. In section 3, we propose general fair exchange with
credit based payment and describe the details of the fair ex-
change protocol. In section 4, we first discuss the general
characteristics of on-line gambling and then develop a se-
cure protocol for on-line “luck based” games. Finally, sec-
tion 5 concludes the paper with some final remarks.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Equality proof of knowledge
The scheme of equality proof of knowledge was ini-
tially proposed by Chaum and Pedersen [8] and Verheul
and Tilborg [9]. The scheme is about proving knowledge
of something without revealing anything about its content.
The public information includes a prime numberp and a
generatorgi 2 Zp , i = 1; 2;    ; l, where l is the confi-
dence level. In order to provex, the prover choosesr 2 Zp
and computes
ai = g
r
i mod p;
hi = g
x
i mod p:
Challengesc andz are calculated as follows
c = H(g1jjg2jj    jjgljja1jja2jj    jjaljjh1jjh2jj    jjhl);
z = cx+ r mod p:
The verifier will check the following equation to prove the
knowledge
gzi
?
= hciai mod p.
For all i, gzi = h
c
iai mod p indicatess that the prover has
the knowledge; otherwise, he does not.
2.2 Proof of equivalence of discrete logarithm to
discrete log-logarithm (PEDLDLL)
PEDLDLL was initially proposed by Stadler [10]. For
two given primesp andq (wherep = 2q + 1), letx; y; z 2
Zq andX;Y 2 Z

p . There exists an 2 f1; 2;   q   2g
such thaty = x mod q andY = Xz

mod p. With-
out revealing andz, a prover, who knows, can gen-
erate a certificate to prove thaty = x mod q andY =
Xz

mod p.
If the confidence level isl, for i = 1; 2;   ; l, the prover
chooseswi 2 f1; 2;   ; q   2g and computest(xi) =
xwi mod q, t(Xi) = Xz
wi mod p. Then he could get
c = Hl(xjjyjjzjjXjjY jjt(x1)jjt(X1)jj    jjt(xl)jjt(Xl)).
For every bitc = c1c2   cl, the prover computesR =
(r1; r2;    ; rl), whereri = wi   ci mod q   1. The cer-
tificate is given by(R; c).
During certificate verification, the verifier will check
whether
c = Hl(xjjyjjzjjXjjY jju1jjU1jj    jjuljjUl)
whereui = xriyci mod q and
Ui =
(
Xz
ri mod p if ci = 0
Y z
ri mod p if ci = 1
3. General Fair Exchange with Credit Based
Payment
The fair exchange scheme proposed in this paper is based
on credit payment scheme discussed in [5]. We assume that
the bank and a TTP (trusted third party) are off-line. We
will also assume that the credit information of the client is
anonymous with non-interactive equality proof.
The following notations are used in the description of the
fair exchange scheme:
 PKX: Public key of user X.
 skx: Private key of user X.
 C: Client with public keyPKC and private keyskc
 M : Merchant with public keyPKM and private key
skm
 TTP : TTP with public keyPKT and private keyskt
 B: Bank with public keyPKB and private keyskb.
 tp : Timestamp generated by partyP .
 <    >skx: Signature with secret keyskx.
 Penc(PKX;M ): Encryption of messageM with pub-
lic keyPKX.
 Pdec(skx;Cipher): Decryption of ciphertextC with
private keyskx.
 H(M ): Hash function on messageM .
3.1. System setup
The credit token is of the form
C = < C; l; h1; h2;    ; hl; E;A >skb
The credit token contains the client’s identityC, the confi-
dence levell, the expiry dateE, maximum credit amount
A andhi = gxi mod p, wheregi 2 Z

p are common genera-
tors fori = 1; 2;    ; l, wherex is the concatenation of PIN
number, credit card number and salt. The credit token is
signed by the bank using its private keyskb. The payment
slip token has the form
S = C;M;O; $; tc; H(C;M;O; $; tc),
whereM is ID of merchant,O is the order,$ is the amount
of money and currency type andtc is the timestamp gener-
ated by the client C. The payment slip is signed by the client
with private keyskc.
The encrypted payment slip token is
CS = Penc(PKT;< S >skc).
CSCert is the token to proveCS is a ciphertext ofS with-
out disclosing the signature. Let us consider the construc-
tion of the tokenCSCert. Let p andq be prime numbers
of the formp = 2q + 1. We will assume thatq   1 has
no small prime factors except 2. We will use ElGamal sys-
tem for encryption and decryption by TTP. ElGamal sys-
tem hasg a generator selected fromZq , whereq is a prime
number. skt 2 f1; 2;   ; q   2g is the private key and
PKT = gskt mod q is the public key.
For encryption of messagem, we have the following:
Penc(PKT;m) = (W;V ) mod q,
whereW = gw andV = m(PKT )w , w 2 f1; 2;   ; q  
2g is a randomly chosen number.
The signature scheme works as follows: Choose a ran-
domk 2 Zq , the signature has the form
< S >skc  (r; s)
wherer = Gk mod p ands = k 1(H(S)+rskc) mod q
andPKC = Gskc mod p.
Encrypting the above signatures with PKT , we have,
Penc(PKT; s) = (W;V ). The encrypted payment slip
with signature is then given as follows:
CS = fr;W; V g;
whereW = gw mod q, V = s(PKT )w mod q.
With transformationx = g, y = W 1 mod q, z =
PKT , X = rV mod p, Y = GH(S)(PKC)r mod p and
 =  w, choosewi 2 f1; 2;   ; q   2g, then
t(xi) = xwi mod q, t(Xi) = Xz
wi mod p
and
c = Hl(xjjyjjzjjXjjY jjt(x1)jjt(X1)jj    jjt(xl)jjt(Xl))
c = c1c2    cl
ri = wi   ci mod q   1
(R; c) is the certificateCSCert for CS.
The process of verification is to check,
c = Hl((xjjyjjzjjXjjY jju1jjU1jj    jjuljjUl)
whereui = xriyci mod q, and
Ui =
(
Xz
ri mod p if ci = 0
Y z
ri mod p if ci = 1
3.2. Fair-exchange protocol
The following is the fair-exchange protocol,
FAIR-EXCHANGE PROTOCOL
Merchant Client
1: <offer>skm
                                        !
2: Pencr (PKM; (C; M; O; $; tc)); CS ; CSCert
                                         
3: Pencr(PKC; <offer>skm )
                                        !
4: Pencr (PKM; <S>skc)
                                         
The above protocol is totally fair. If both the client and
the merchant perform properly, the TTP will not be in-
volved in the protocol. In Step 1, the merchant sends
his signed offer to the client. In Step 2, the client sends
Pencr(PKM; (C;M;O; $; tc)); CS ; CSCert to the mer-
chant, the merchant (1) checks credit information with
equality proof of knowledge; (2) usesCSCert to check
CS is the ciphertext of the payment slipS signed by the
client. If the client performs improperly, the merchant
can detect it and stop the protocol. In step 3, the mer-
chant sendsPencr(PKC;< offer >skm) to the client.
If the merchant performs improperly in step 3, the client
can check the offer and stop the protocol. In step 4, the
client sendsPencr(PKM;< S >skc) to the merchant. If
the merchant can not get the payment, he would bring his
Pencr(PKC; (offer)skm) andCS, CSCert to TTP. TTP
opensCS and sends the payment to the merchant, mean-
while sends thePencr(PKC; (offer)skm) to the client.
4. Fair On-line Gambling
There are different kinds of on-line gambling in the real
world, but there are some general characteristics for all
gambling systems. In this paper, we only consider the
credit-based payment. The following are important char-
acteristics of on-line gambling:
a) Two-way payments involved.
— Anonymous.
— Credit Card Payment.
b) Bank is off-line.
c) Trusted Third Party is off-line.
d) Cheating is prevented during whole process.
— Information must be checked.
— If there is a dispute, TTP will reslove it.
In the following, we will discuss games from authorized
organizations and pure luck games respectively.
4.1. Games from authorized organizations
In this section, we assume that games are from autho-
rized organizations. The most important assumption with
on-line casino is that it should not be trusted. Both Client
and Dealer must keep some secrets of their choice before
they have given their bets. We have developed the protocol
as follows:
PROTOCOL OFGAMBLING FROM AUTHORITY
Client Dealer
1: Pencr (PKD; M0); <H(M0)>skc
                                         !
2: Pencr (PKC; M1); <H(M1)>skd
                                          
3: Pencr (PKD; CStatus); <H(CStatus)>skc; CSC; CSCCert
                                         !
4: Pencr (PKC; DStatus); <H(DStatus)>skd; CSD; CSDCert
                                          
5: Pencr (PKD; options); <H(options)>skc
                                         !
6: Pencr (PKC; Gid; result); fIf client wins; Pencr(PKC; CSD)g
                                          
7: Pencr (PKC; CSC)
                                         !
1. Client chooses a game and sends the message to Dealer
M0 = (GName; C; trc)
whereGName is the name of the game to play,C is
the client ID,trc is timestamp for the message.
2. Dealer prepares the game for the client
M1 = (Game; Pencr(PKT;
< Gnmae; GID >skd); tgc)
Game is the executable program.GID is the de-
fault parameter for the game to run,tgc is the times-
tamp for the preparation of the game. For the client,
GID is the secret until the end of the game.<
Gnmae; GID >skd is encrypted with TTP’s public
keyPKT . If something is wrong, TTP can decrypt it
and get theGID.
3. Client runs the game, gives his option and prepares his
payment slip for betting.
(a) Client gives his option
GStatus = C; M0; M1;
Pencr(PKT; < option >skc)
For Dealer, Client’s option is secret until it is nec-
essary to make it public. Client’s
< option >skc is encrypted with TTP’s public
keyPKT and has the signature of Client. If nec-
essary, TTP can open it.
(b) Client prepares payment slip
SC =< CStatus >skc
CStatus = (GStatus; CC; D; $AC; tcbc)
whereCC is the credit information of Client, D is
dealer identification,$AC is quantity of money, and
tcbc is timestamp.
Encrypted Payment slip:
CSC = Pencr(PKT; SC).
The payment slipCSC contains the information of
game status, information of credit and information of
betting. With techniques ofPEDLDLL discussed
in the second section of this paper,CSCCert could
be constructed for checking thatCSC is the encrypted
payment slip.
4. Dealer prepares his payment slip based on client’s bet-
ting,
SD =< DStatus >skd
DStatus = (CStatus; CD; $AD; tdbc)
where CD: credit information of Dealer; $AD:
quantity of money;tdbc: timestamp.
Encrypted payment slip:
CSD = Pencr(PKT; SD)
The payment slipCSD contains the current informa-
tion of game status, credit and betting. With techniques
ofPEDLDLL,CSDCert is constructed for ckecking
thatCSD is the encrypted payment slip.
5. Client sends his option to Dealer by message
Pencr(PKD; option); < H(option) >skc
The message is encrypted with Dealer’s public key
PKD. Dealer can read the message and know Client’s
option. Based on Client’s options andGID, Dealer can
get the result of the game.
6. Dealer sends Client token
Pencr(PKC; GID; result), the Client can get
GID. At this time, Client knows both theGID
and his option, he can run the game and get the
result. If Client wins, Dealer also sends Client token
Pencr(PKC; CSD), Client gets the payment slip
CSD.
7. If Dealer wins, Client sends Dealer
Pencr(PKC; CSC) and Dealer gets payment
slipCSC).
Whole process of the gambling and payment is fair in the
above protocol. Before step 5, both the Dealer and Client
can not get the result of the game. Dealer hasGID as se-
cret, Client hasoptions as secret. Both of them encrypt
their secrets with TTP’s public key at first. They make their
secrets public in step 5 and step 6. If the loser refuses to
pay, the winner can bring encrypted payment slipCSC and
CSD to TTP. TTP can then open them and check the result
of game.CSC contains the information of Client’s betting.
CSD contains the information of Dealer’s betting. Both of
them are necessary for the TTP to check the betting process
and result. Based on checking result, TTP can forwardSC
to Dealer if Dealer wins. ForwardSD to Client if Client
wins. The whole process is fair for both Client and Dealer.
Before Client has sent hisCSC, Client has the right to
quit the protocol. Before Dealer sends hisCSD, Dealer has
the right to quit the protocol. In above cases, both of them
have no peer’s encrypted payment slip, so they can not get
any payment or useful information of the game. the protocol
is aborted but the process is fair. If one party has peer’s
encrypted payment slip, he can bring bothCSC andCSD to
TTP. The protocol can finish with the help of TTP. TTP can
get all information of the game and betting fromCSC and
CSD. TTP can get the result of the game and forward the
payment to the winner.
The above protocol can be extended in a real applica-
tion. In step 3, Client perhaps discloses part of his options
for the game to progress or prepare encrypted payment slips
for betting. In step 4, Dealer perhaps provides some infor-
mation of the current game or prepare encrypted payment
slip to response Clients betting. In step 5, Client makes
his current options public. Payments are given if the Client
chooses to trust the Dealer. This kind of processes can re-
peat again and again until the end of the game or the Client
chooses not to trust the Dealer. The Dealer sends Client
GID, Client can run the game on his local machine to check
the whole process of gambling. If a cheating occurs, he can
bring all encrypted payment slips to TTP to prove that the
Dealer is cheating. The whole process is fair in this case.
4.2 Pure Luck Games
Many casino games are solely games of chance [11].
This kind of games can be abstracted as generating of a
random number. We assume that there are only two par-
ties for the pure luck game. They will cooperate with each
other to generate the random number, during the process,
they will bet on the result of the random number. In this
part, we will discuss the fainess both of game process and
the dual-payment between two parties.
The following is the two-party protocol for generating a
random number and how they bet and arrange payment on
the output of the random number. We out-line the protocol
as:
1. Alice generates a random number and signs the hash
of the random number, Alice sends Bob:
M1 = H(RA); < H(RA) >ska; Pencr(PKT;
< RA >ska)
Pencr(PKT; < RA >ska) is the TTP’s public key
encryption of the random numberRA with the signa-
ture of Alice.
2. Bob generates a random number and signs the hash of
the random number, Bob sends Alice:
M2 = H(RB); < M1;H(RB) >skb;
Pencr(PKT; < RB >skb)
Pencr(PKT; < RB >skb) is the TTP’s public key
encryption of the random numberRB with the signa-
ture of Bob.
3. Alice prepares her encrypted payment slip and the cer-
tificate of the encrypted payment slip
SA =< A; CA; B;M1;M2; Abetting; ta >ska
where A is Alice’s identification; CA is credit
information (defined in section 3.1) ;B is Bob
identification;M1 andM2 are messages of step 1 and
step 2.Abetting contains Alice’s betting options and
amount of money for this betting.ta is timestamp.
Encrypted Payment slip is:
CSA = Pencr(PKT; SA)
With the technique ofPEDLDLL, Alice counstructs
certificate of the encrypted payment slipCSACert.
Alice sends Bob
M3 = (ABetting; CSA; CSACert )
4. Bob prepares his encrypted payment slip and the cer-
tificate of the encrypted payment slip
SB =< B; CB; A;M3; Bbetting; tb >skb
where B is Bob’s identification; CB is credit in-
formation (defined in section 3.1) ;A is Alice’s
identification; M3 is the message of last step.
Bbetting contains Bob’s response of Alice’s betting
which contains Bob’s amount of money on this
betting.tb is timestamp.
Encrypted Payment slip is:
CSB = Pencr(PKT; SB)
With the technique ofPEDLDLL, Bob counstructs
certificate of the encrypted payment slipCSBCert.
Bob sends Alice
M4 = Bbetting; CSB ; CSBCert
5. Alice sends Bob the actual value of numberRA:
M5 = RA; < M4; RA >ska
6. Bob sends Alice the actual value of numberRB:
M6 = RB ; < M5; RB >skb
7. Both Alice and Bob computes the random number
R = RA XOR RB
8. If Alice loses, Alice sends Bob her payment slipSA; if
Bob loses, Bob sends Alice his payment slipSB .
In this protocol, Alice and Bob sends their hashes at first,
then they give their betting and prepare their payment slips.
They encrypt their payment slips with TTP’s public key and
construct certificates for verifying the encrypted payment
slips. They send their bettings, encrypted payment slips and
certificates for verifying their encrypted payment slips. In
this step, Alice and Bob have given their bettings with pay-
ments and can not change, but they can not get the money
at this time because payment slips are encrypted with TTP’s
public key. In step 5 and 6, they send their actual chosen
values to peer party, then both Alice and Bob can compute
the number.
The protocol is totally fair for both Alice and Bob. If the
loser refuses to pay, the winner could bring Encrypted pay-
ment slips bothCSA andCSB to TTP. TTP can open them
and check the process of betting. TTP can then forward
payment slip to the winner. Alice can quit the protocol at
or before step 3, Bob can quit the protocol at or before step
4. At any other time, if one party stop the protocol, the peer
party can bringCSA andCSB to TTP, the protocol can con-
tinue the the end (the winner receives the payment) with the
help of TTP.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have exploited PEDLDLL techniques
to develop fair protocols for on-line gambling. We have
discussed the general fair-exchange protocol with credit
payment. Base on general fair-exchange protocol, we have
presented protocols for games from authority organization
and pure luck games which are useful in implementing
some real on-line games. Our protocols can guarantee the
fairness of both the games and payments. The major feature
of our protocols lies in the using of encrypted payment slips
and certificates of the encrypted payment slips. The credit
information is anonymous in our protocols. Our protocols
are only suitable for some of on-line games, there are many
open problems for the fairness of on-line gambling, for
example, if there are more than two people invloved in a
game, how to deal with the issue of collusion? How to
design fair protocol for different kinds of games such as
card games [12]? There are a lot of interesting issues to
study on on-line gambling.
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